Emerging from the growing swell of recent literature concerning Kant's practical philosophy, one interpretation of his procedure for testing maxims has crested above others. The influential interpretation to which I refer believes that the categorical imperative guides a procedure that finds maxims impermissible when they cannot be universalized without producing a 'practical' contradiction. As a major proponent of the practical contradiction interpretation, Christine Korsgaard claims that, while there is textual support for this point of view, she is more concerned with (...) developing a defensible interpretation of maxim testing for a ‘Kantian’ system of morality. Accordingly, one cannot simply attempt to evaluate such a theory solely by considering its various incongruities with Kant's specific claims and arguments. Instead, my evaluation of the practical contradiction interpretation will examine: whether it is a procedure that is applicable to a full range of maxims; whether it maintains a distinct advantage over the alternative readings; and whether it is an internally coherent and consistent model for testing maxims. I propose, here, that regardless of the practical contradiction test's many advantages, it fails with regard to all three of these questions. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that Isaiah Berlin’s seminal essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” has to a large extent set the tone and determined the content of the debates within political philosophy in the English-speaking world. Berlin maintains that the conceptual and institutional history of liberty can be understood in terms of the various responses to the logically distinct questions: “Who governs me?” and “How far does government interfere with me?”. In Berlin’s first question, the salient issue is whether the valid (...) authority to positively rule an individual resides within the individual herself or in some external person, social class, institution, empirical circumstance, or tradition. In contrast with the personal freedom to direct oneself, the second issue is concerned with liberating the individual from the coercion of others, especially the government, by limiting authority as such. Berlin dedicates much of his essay to demonstrating that the positive and negative concepts of liberty are not merely two sides of the same coin; rather, he argues that in human psychology and history these mark “two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life”. According to Berlin’s line of reasoning, to perceive the personal authority to rule oneself as one’s primary end requires a sacrifice of one’s negative liberty. Reciprocally, to make the limitation of authority and coercion in general one’s highest end demands that one relinquish some positive freedom. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that Isaiah Berlin’s seminal essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” has to a large extent set the tone and determined the content of the debates within political philosophy in the English-speaking world. Berlin maintains that the conceptual and institutional history of liberty can be understood in terms of the various responses to the logically distinct questions: “Who governs me?” and “How far does government interfere with me?”. In Berlin’s first question, the salient issue is whether the valid (...) authority to positively rule an individual resides within the individual herself or in some external person, social class, institution, empirical circumstance, or tradition. In contrast with the personal freedom to direct oneself, the second issue is concerned with liberating the individual from the coercion of others, especially the government, by limiting authority as such. Berlin dedicates much of his essay to demonstrating that the positive and negative concepts of liberty are not merely two sides of the same coin; rather, he argues that in human psychology and history these mark “two profoundly divergent and irreconcilable attitudes to the ends of life”. According to Berlin’s line of reasoning, to perceive the personal authority to rule oneself as one’s primary end requires a sacrifice of one’s negative liberty. Reciprocally, to make the limitation of authority and coercion in general one’s highest end demands that one relinquish some positive freedom. (shrink)